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Ahmadshah Massoud - Commander of Afghanistan's United Front

Jane's Defence Weekly, Jun

ANTHONY DAVIS 
JDW Correspondent Khwaja Bahauddin, Afghanistan

Following a political accord between leaders of Afghanistan's anti-Taliban United Front (UF), underscored by improved battlefield co-ordination, opposition commander Ahmadshah Massoud anticipates Taliban advances in northern Afghanistan can be checked and even rolled back this summer.

"Last year we were in a particularly bad financial [and economic] position. We had neither money, nor aircraft and ammunition," says Massoud, leader of the UF, during an interview at his Khwaja Bahauddin military headquarters near the Tajikistan border. Failure to support other fronts across the north resulted in a concentration of Taliban forces in the northeast and, after 33 days of bitter fighting and heavy casualties, the fall of Taloqan, his de facto capital, on 6 September last year.

While he was able to prevent the Taliban overrunning Badakhshan province, the fall of Taloqan marked Massoud's greatest setback since his loss of Kabul in September 1996. "There were tactical reasons for our defeat, such as [Taliban] use of armour, but the most important strategic reason was that I was unable to get the war moving in parts of the country in the enemy's rear. When Taloqan fell I had only two helicopters left operating with considerable difficulty between Panjshir and the north. The Taliban were able to bring forces and munitions from everywhere and concentrate pressure against one point."

This year, however, a broad political accord among the often fractious personalities and factions in the anti-Taliban alliance resulted in an agreement to suspend the activities of contending political parties and focus on co-ordinated military resistance, says Massoud. As a result, over the winter and spring there was a significant rise in military activity in pockets of anti-Taliban resistance across north and central Afghanistan. Operations in the central region by Shi'a forces during the late winter derailed a planned Taliban offensive against his own forces north of Kabul, he adds.

In addition to Massoud's northeastern forces, estimated to number some 12,000, an estimated 10,000 other UF fighters operate in at least six pockets of territory in the northern, central and western regions of Afghanistan. Loosely co-ordinated guerrilla units are led by the ex-communist Uzbek militia boss Abdul Rashid Dostam, who, after talks with Massoud, returned to northern Afghanistan in April; Shi'a chiefs Karim Khalili and Mohaqeq, whose mainly ethnic Hazara forces have been repeatedly active in recent months around central Bamian and Yakaolang; and Haji Abdul Qadir who commands Pushtun groups in eastern Kunar and Nangrahar provinces. In the west, Massoud ally Ismael Khan recently returned to boost guerrilla operations in Ghor and Herat provinces, while Massoud loyalist Atta Mohammad heads forces in the Darrah-e-Suf valley in north-central Afghanistan.

Massoud's purchase this winter of five used Mi-17 (NATO reporting name 'Hip') medium-lift transport helicopters has increased his airlift capability to six or seven such aircraft and this, he says, has proved crucial in opening new logistics links with allied fronts. Despite the improvement, however, the longer-term offensive capabilities of UF pockets beyond the northeast will likely be constrained by logistics shortages and limited mobility, say analysts.

Massoud notes that his improved financial position was the result of greater control over the mining and marketing of gems. Taxation from the mining of emeralds in the Panjshir Valley and lapis lazuli from southern Badakhshan province has been a source of revenue for Massoud since the Soviet occupation. However, the UF commander confirms that over the past year he has taken over the lion's share of the gems trade directly, and is marketing both emeralds and lapis internationally.

Massoud is known to buy munitions at favourable rates from Russia and Iran, and in late October last year he met Igor Sergeyev, the then Russian defence minister, in Dushanbe. Early this year he visited Moscow for further talks. In recent weeks his forces have acquired new Soviet-era tanks and armoured fighting vehicles. While Massoud denies reports of financial and other assistance from India, an Indian-manned military field hospital is operating at Parkhar, an Afghan UF base in Tajikistan. In April he visited France and Belgium in a highly publicised first trip to Europe.

Massoud notes that despite mounting international pressure on Pakistan over its support for the Taliban, Islamabad's ruling military regime is anxious to see decisive Taliban gains this year. "Some 10 days after my return from Europe [in late April] Pakistani military chiefs held a meeting in which it was decided to press ahead with the war." As a result, Islamabad is increasing its commitment of what Massoud claims are regular Pakistan Army units to Afghanistan.

Massoud alleges that elements of three Pakistani commando regiments are currently operating in support of Taliban forces and these will soon be reinforced by additional troops from two Frontier Corps regiments. Western military analysts, however, remain sceptical of such claims, pointing out the UF chief has been conspicuously unable to produce convincing evidence of the deployment of regular Pakistani combat units - as distinct from religious volunteers and military advisers attached to Islamabad's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate.

Massoud argues that continued military resistance to the Taliban remains essential if the Kabul regime is to be brought to the negotiating table and the way opened for a political settlement. Such a settlement, he says, should instal an interim government - possibly including ex-king Zahir Shah and other neutral Afghans - which should work to collect weaponry, re-establish security and prepare for general elections after one or two years. The suggestion that elections would be difficult to hold in a country as socially and physically devastated as Afghanistan after such a relatively short interval, he clearly rejects.

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