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Commentary: U.S. policy and the "other" Afghanistan

By ELIE D. KRAKOWSKI

WASHINGTON, April 13 (UPI) -- It may be shrinking, but there's life in it yet.

The Islamic State of Afghanistan, recognized by the United Nations, is still a thorn in the side of the Taliban, the group that is widely regarded as controlling 90 percent of the country. It is the Islamic State of Afghanistan that occupies the Afghan seat in the United Nations, is recognized by a large number of states, and has embassies in many of the European capitals. (The Taliban, in contrast is recognized by three states: Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.)

Commander Massoud -- the legendary leader of those anti-Taliban forces and vice president and defense minister of that government -- has just been touring Europe, where he had a meeting French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine, and addressed the European Parliament. The invitations to address the European Parliament, to meet with Western foreign ministers, even more than what Massoud said, holds an important lesson for U.S. policy.

The claim that the Taliban controls most of Afghanistan's territory may reflect more Taliban and Pakistani statements than reality. Massoud's forces claim areas far beyond those often assigned to them by the press, some of these being very close to the capital, Kabul.

Regardless of the acreage controlled by each side, what is rarely mentioned is that the population in each of the opposing camps is almost evenly split. Some, as the Indian officials I met with recently, speak about this, but it is rarely mentioned in the United States. The Indians assert that Massoud's forces have somewhere around 40 percent of the population at present.

In the numbers game as in much else, what is interesting is how little things change. During the Soviet-Afghan war of 1979-1989, the almost constant leitmotif was the same: The Soviets controlled 90 percent of Afghanistan's territory. The implication then, as now, was obvious: Deal with the power at hand, since it is the one likely to remain there. In the Soviet context as in today's, those numbers were largely irrelevant -- although they more adequately reflected reality then.

In the Soviet case, Moscow had never attempted to control the countryside. Hence, how much territory they in fact held mattered little. What did matter was their control over the country. Soviet troops were in the cities and large garrisons, and their strategy was based on keeping the resistance off-balance, slowly hoping to wear it down and strangle it.

The technique was to chase the population out of the rural areas, thus depriving the Afghan guerrillas of their natural base of support, thereby destroying them. This strategy led to the large refugee populations in Pakistan and Iran that persist to this day.

The Taliban's hold on the country is far more tenuous than the Soviet grip ever was. The Taliban today survive not because they control the country, but because so far there is no credible alternative. That may be changing. There has been growing dissatisfaction with the Taliban over the past couple of years.

There have been instances of protests against Taliban actions in a number of areas, as well as reports of violent clashes with opponents in supposedly Taliban-controlled areas. Afghans are also increasingly irritated by the presence of Arabs and other foreigners in the training camps for suspect terrorists. Afghans have complained about the flouting of Afghan traditions and law by these camps.

There are even now reports in the Pakistani press claiming that Saudi-born Islamic alleged terrorist Osama bin Laden, who is said to be based in Afghanistan, is actually mediating in disputes between the Taliban leadership and Hekmatyar, another Afghan extremist and former protégé of the Pakistanis.

The smashing of Buddhas can be taken to express many things. One of them is the growing frustration of the Taliban before their own continued inability to consolidate, to bring to the people anything more than a minimum of draconian order.

If the Taliban are frustrated, how much more so must the Afghans living under their so-called rule? How frustrated must even the Pakistanis be, who have gradually been losing control over the monster they earlier created -- or allowed to be created?

The lack of an obvious alternative should nevertheless not obscure its feasibility, and even its likely appearance in the very near future. Reliable sources have begun to report that the Afghans for the first time appear to be ready for such an alternative and are actively working toward it.

Some Taliban appear to be conveying to certain people that their commitment to their own movement is far from solid. These same sources have begun to allude to the possibility of developments in the near future concerning the coming into being of such an alternative. Yet, at the very time the European Parliament hears Commander Massoud, the U.N.-recognized Afghan government's Washington embassy remains shuttered.

U.N. sanctions explicitly seek to prevent the arming of the Taliban while allowing that of the Northern Alliance forces. The current sanctions include a ban on Taliban official access in all countries. Their U.N. office was closed. But how can continued denial to the recognized Afghan government be reconciled with that approach? Rightful access to their embassy is -- or should be -- pure common sense. From a realpolitik perspective, there could be no better complement to the sanctions approach.

Putting pressure on the Taliban should entail a desire to maximize chances of success. That, in turn, means making use of available means. The "Islamic State of Afghanistan" is precisely such a means. Support for it does not mean an endorsement of all its positions. It simply increases the leverage of the United States. The Europeans have understood that. So have the Taliban, if their anger and protests are any indication. Such symbolic acts as reopening the embassy and allowing the Afghans to resume their rightful place can only play a positive role.

But we should go farther. Commander Massoud should also be invited to present his case in the United States and meet with high U.S. officials. Congress might want to consider following in the footsteps of the European Parliament.

Washington should consider extending political and diplomatic support to Massoud's government. Such steps in no way preclude dealing with the Taliban and exploring further a peaceful resolution of the long standing conflict. Other states, in the region and out of it, do it. So can we.

(Dr. Krakowski is a senior fellow at the Washington-based American Foreign Policy Council, and has traveled recently in Afghanistan.)

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