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Afghanistan: IRIN Interview with US Ambassador to Pakistan

UN OCHA Integrated Regional Information Network for Central Asia (IRIN-CA)

ISLAMABAD, 23 April (IRIN) - The first US humanitarian assessment mission to Afghanistan to have been conducted since 1998 returned to Islamabad on 19 April. The US Ambassador to Pakistan, William Milam, told IRIN that preliminary reports indicated that the situation in Afghanistan was worsening. Although it was too early to predict the outcome of the mission, Milam hoped that it would enable the US and other donors to respond before the situation deteriorated further. He said that the mission's visit might lead to increased US humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan. With no indication that either the Taliban movement or the opposition Northern Alliance was interested in peace negotiations, Milam considered that conditions were inappropriate for the proposal of a reconstruction fund. However, he added that a forthcoming anti-narcotic assessment in Afghanistan could lead to the beginning of a rehabilitation process in rural areas.

Milam said that the sanctions (imposed under UN Security Council resolutions 1267 and 1333), which were aimed at trying to influence the Taliban leadership to meet international norms of behaviour, should have accelerated the peace process. However, he said that deliberate misrepresentations on the part of the Taliban authorities and their supporters had led to the misperception that the sanctions had exacerbated the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan.

Question: You have just sent a humanitarian assessment team to Afghanistan. How would you describe the mission?

Answer: We've been worried - I certainly have personally - about which way the humanitarian situation was heading in Afghanistan, and since we are putting a fair amount of resources in there to try to help the poor Afghan people, who are victims of both natural and man-made disaster through no fault of their own. But my sense was that things were perhaps getting worse in Afghanistan and we ought to go look. This was, as you can imagine, a relatively difficult issue, because we have considered Afghanistan for a number of years now to be a security problem, and have not wanted to send Americans up there - and have actually warned others that it might be insecure up there. But we've had good cooperation from the Taliban on this mission, and we needed a first-hand assessment about which way the situation was going. I don't want to say anything definitively until I talk to the team on their return. We have preliminary reports that things are bad and getting worse there. I'm hoping that this will enable not only the US government but western donor governments to get ahead of the curve in Afghanistan - the humanitarian curve. We need to perhaps do more.

Q: Do you think this mission might lead to a change in US humanitarian policy [towards Afghanistan]?

A: Not a change, not at all. But I would think that it's possibly going to lead to an increase in the provision of food and other relief goods to the Afghan people. That wouldn't be a change in policy. In fact, quite the contrary, it would be a continuation and expansion of present policy, which is to try and meet the needs of the poor, stricken people of Afghanistan to the extent we can and in the best way possible. [According to a US humanitarian aid fact sheet released on 8 December 2000, US humanitarian assistance totalled over US $113.2 million in 2000, making the US the largest single donor of assistance to the Afghan people.]

Q: Although there's been an unprecedented movement of displaced this year, do you think that the international community should be purely focused on relief assistance, or do you think that we need to be looking at rehabilitation to help Afghans better sustain themselves?

A: I think ultimately we will have to look to rehabilitation - there's no doubt about that. We would not want to continue to provide relief for ever. We may be looking to some rehabilitation in the near future, because, on the narcotics side, there is another team going in, and this team will evaluate the extent and effectiveness of the ban on poppy growth that the Taliban has promulgated. If the ban turns out to be as effective as we think it is, there will be some movement in the donor governments who deal with anti-narcotics assistance to begin to find ways to provide seeds and assistance to the farmers directly. I would consider that to be the beginning of this rehabilitation process, but the larger part of rehabilitation has to wait for the political situation to settle. There's a war going on there. I don't see how you can rehabilitate much when it's likely to be overrun by combat. So there needs to be a peace process and peace treaty. There needs to be some movement on the part of the Taliban - or whatever government is put in place there - to meet the requirements of the international community in political and other terms.

I think the war is the major factor, but once the war is over there has to be an account taken of whether whoever is ruling Afghanistan is ruling it in accordance with the various concerns of the rest of the world. Those concerns involve terrorism and other issues that we've addressed to the Taliban. I have no way of knowing whether the government that came out of a peace agreement - what it's policies would be. So I think we have to wait and see on that.

Q: The peace process is the key to progress in terms of conditions in Afghanistan. Critics have said that the recent unilateral sanctions have made the UN peace process partial; in other words, the UN is not an impartial mediator. What's your view on this? Do you think it is time for a new initiative?

A: Not as yet. The sanctions [imposed] under [UN Resolution] 1333, as well as the sanctions imposed under 1267, are in a broad sense expressing the frustration of the international community and the Security Council over the refusal of the Taliban to adhere to international norms and behaviour. They were primarily directed at the presence of these terrorist groups there. They are aimed at ensuring, or inducing, the Taliban to meet the requirements of international justice and to meet the norms of international behaviour. So I think the resolution is an expression of the [the international community's] rage and frustration with a movement that controls 90 percent of Afghanistan, a movement that defies the will - the expressed will through the Security Council - of the international community with regard primarily to the hosting of terrorists. The sanctions shouldn't have any impact on the peace process. They should have accelerated the peace process. But one has to understand that in my two and a half years of dealing with the Taliban and in dealing with this Afghanistan situation, I have not seen a great deal of interest on the part of the Taliban in the peace process. I am not convinced that if sanctions were not in place, we would be any further along. I think there would be some other excuse.

Q: Does that mean that in your dealings with Taliban officials, you do not sense any commitment at all to a peace process?

A: No, I don't want to say that. That goes too far. The Taliban don't necessarily speak well with one voice. Some of the officials that I talk to are very interested in the peace process, and I believe are trying to further it. But it has not progressed, so that implies that other officials are not so interested in it. That's all I'm saying. It hasn't got anywhere very far, and every time one thought that there was some hope, it just fell apart. I'm not blaming one side - neither side has gone the full nine yards that you need to go to engage in a real effective peace process and to come to a peace agreement. It appears to me that both sides still harbour the desire to win Afghanistan by military means, something that I don't think is possible. But, in their heart of hearts, that's what they are hoping for.

Q: One solution that has been used elsewhere in the world has been trying to lure warring factions with a reconstruction fund. We mentioned that earlier, but do you think this is an initiative that should be followed up more closely?

A: No, at this point I don't think that the politics are right. I would add at this point that the Secretary-General's [Personal] Representative for Afghanistan, Francesco Vendrell, and his predecessor, are doing a superb job. I take my hat off to them... When you have two sides - neither of which are dedicated to achieving peace by negotiation, but mostly dedicated to achieving peace by force of arms - then you are in a very difficult situation if you're a mediator. These people have faced almost insuperable odds and they've done a terrific job. However, I don't think the political context is right for the offering of reconstruction assistance. I think reconstruction assistance would be down the road from a peace agreement, and not far down the road. But it would also have to involve some recognition and some action on the part of the Taliban to meet the demands of the world community with regard to terrorists. Those demands are expressed in [UN Security Council Resolution] 1333.

Q: With respect to the unilateral arms embargo [in Resolution 1333], do you think that the Pakistan authorities are doing all they can to uphold the sanctions?

A: I think so. Pakistan at the highest levels and fairly broadly throughout their government have assured me, and others, including UN officials, that they will adhere to and observe the UN sanctions. I have no reason to think that they will not.

Q: Do you think the change of government in the US will lead to any shift in policies? Has the Bush administration brought any changes?

A: I can't say. The new administration is still putting itself together. There are a number of very critical important offices that are yet to be filled with confirmed appointees. I think it was only yesterday that the White House announced the intention to nominate a person to be Assistant Secretary for South Asia. That's probably the key position in determining policy both on Afghanistan and for the rest of South Asia. The person who was announced was a lady called Christina Rocca, who was quite well known to this Embassy and to South Asian embassies and governments. But she has some way to go. An intention to nominate means that she probably does not have all the necessary clearances in the nomination process. She certainly hasn't yet got confirmation from the Senate, which she needs. So we're looking at another 30-60 days until she is in place. So until we get her and other officials confirmed and in place, I think you won't see the administration being able to deal with long-term policy issues. But it's the process of reviewing policy and perhaps changing it that occurs when these people are in place and able to study the situation.

Having said all of that, on the humanitarian side I don't believe that you'll see a change in US policy in Afghanistan. You might see an expansion of US assistance, which would be an expansion in US policy to assist the people of Afghanistan.

Q: This is the first time that US staff have gone into Afghanistan since 1998. The United Kingdom has taken restrictions off its own nationals working in Afghanistan. Is the US likely to do the same?

A: The question is always under review, and we'll see how things go. This assessment team seems to have gone well in terms of security. There is the anti-narcotics team that is going in as part of UNDCP [United Nations Drug Control Programme] and we'll see how that goes. There is a very grave and inherent problem there, and that is the presence in Afghanistan of a number of terrorist organisations, at least one or two of which have sworn to kill Americans - one of which we know has a record of killing Americans. So the question of security for Americans becomes a little dicier. But we will continue to review that issue. We may continue to review it because of the ongoing humanitarian crisis there, probably the need to have more people go in for hands-on issues. But I don't see any rescinding of that at the moment.

Q: What's your personal prognosis, personal hopes, for Afghanistan? Do you see the situation improving over the next two years? Do you see the warring parties coming to their senses, or do you see the conflict continuing?

A: I'm very pessimistic. One can hope that the drought ends, and the rains come back and people can begin to grow their own food again. One would hope that the natural causes of the disaster are ended. But that's an act of God and not of man, so we'll just have to wait and see. But on the human side, I see no indication that either side is very interested in the peace process, and if that is true, then one can predict the continuation of the war. Each spring, summer and fall there will be fighting, each winter they'll bathe their wounds and restock their supplies, and then they'll go at it again. I see very little hope that the war is going to end, and that's the key isn't it? So I'm not very optimistic about it. Despite the fact that the Taliban understand [that resolution] 1333 points a finger right at them for defying the international community's will and requirements, I've heard nothing that would give me any indication that there's any chance they will change their policies on that.

Q: What's your view of Taliban Prime Minister Mullah Mohammad Rabbani's death? Has that shifted anything?

A: I can't evaluate that. The goings-on inside the Taliban superstructure are relatively opaque, and so you never know who is saying what and who's advocating what. And you have to remember that, as far as I know, Mullah Rabbani was sick for a very long time and not probably operating at full steam for many, many months. So I don't know whether his demise brings any changes in terms of policies or attitude or outlook. I just can't say. It turns out he was a very young man, although I never met him. He was only 47. That's very young to be passing away from cancer. On a personal human basis, it's tragic to see someone die so young. One would assume that he did have effective influence when he was well inside the Taliban. But I can't say more than that.

Q: What's your analysis on the destruction of the buddhas? Was that necessarily a religious act?

A: I'm not clear on what caused it. I've heard people assert that it was an act of retaliation against sanctions, but there's all kinds of ways that they could have retaliated against sanctions. Why pick these ancient relics, which have great value to the world in general and particularly to another culture which they represent and which dominated Afghanistan 1,000-2,000 years ago? I don't actually believe that it was in retaliation against the sanctions, but that may have been part of it. I can't really explain why they did it. It was so callous and uncaring of other cultures that it boggles the mind sometimes to try to understand it. You see statues in other parts of the world looted or defaced for profit. People cut the faces in Angkor Wat [ancient site in Cambodia]. While that is equally disgusting, the motive is understandable: profit is profit. But there was no profit in this at all. There was no motivation that I can understand. If it was driven by their version of Islamic code, that would be disputed by almost every Islamic scholar that I know. There isn't an Islamic scholar that I have ever talked to who would have supported that kind of action. It's hard to believe that it was done for religious reasons; it's also unbelievable that it was done for the sanctions.

Q: Over 170,000 Afghan refugees have come across into Pakistan since June last year. UNHCR estimates it is even higher than this. There have been calls to send people back to Afghanistan. What's your view on how these people should be treated?

A: Refugees always become a political issue. I have been ambassador in two other countries that have serious refugee problems. In Bangladesh, when we had a quarter of a million refugees, it became a political issue. I think that's understandable. You can see how illegal immigrants, as well as sometimes legal immigrants, become political issues in the United States, a developed and relatively prosperous country. So, in a country where there isn't so much widespread prosperity, where incomes are much lower and jobs are much harder to get, the influx of a whole large number of refugees who require resources and quite often take jobs is obviously going to be a political issue, and it is going to create a lot of neuralgia on the part of the local populace these refugees have flooded in on. So, I understand why the Pakistanis have a harder line on the refugees, because I think they are hearing from their own people that "enough is enough". On the other hand, there are clearly very legitimate refugees who have come into Pakistan. As you know, there is a difference between economic refugees and other kinds. It's hard to separate these out, because some of them are fleeing from multiple causes: the drought, hunger, the war and sometimes - particularly if they're minorities - from Taliban oppression. We know that the Taliban murdered people in Yawkawlang.

I have been working hard, and I continue to work hard, to ask the Pakistan government to back off from its very, very hardline position, and to document those refugees that have flooded in; for those who are legitimate refugees to actually move some of them out of Jalozai camp, because it's overcrowded. And I have been working within the US government to increase the assistance we give to refugees here. This is a question on which the Pakistanis are schizophrenic, because on one hand they say they need it, and they do; on the other hand, they don't want to make life too easy for refugees, because it draws [in] more, and that's understandable. But I would like to see more UN donor country assistance for the refugees that are in Pakistan. And I would like to see much more assistance to the displaced persons who have had to flee their homes in Afghanistan for economic or other reasons... and who live in these displaced persons camps all over Afghanistan.

I think that our next task is to accomplish both of those [objectives] as fast as we can. And I think when we are able to show the Pakistanis that we really mean it, on both counts, that the Pakistanis will find the political will they need to document the new refugees and to give them better living conditions somewhere else other than the present camps they're in. That's my great hope. We, the US, are working hard in this respect. It's an uphill battle.

Q: Do you think that there is a perception among Afghans that their current situation is due to the sanctions?

A: It's a perception among Afghans. I'm afraid that even some of the UN agencies have come under the impression that the sanctions are creating, helping, or exacerbating the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan. It's also a perception among the Taliban, and some of the Pakistanis in this government have tried to foster it, because they don't like sanctions - so let's make the sanctions look bad by claiming that they are the cause, or at least part of the cause, of the humanitarian problems. To the extent that the Taliban and the Pakistanis get in the way of the humanitarian efforts, block them or impede them in some way, and claim sanctions are the reason, then they can make that a self-fulfilling prophecy in part. And there has been some evidence that there have been some efforts to do that - that both Pakistan and the Taliban have impeded some of the humanitarian efforts, claiming that they violated the sanctions, which they don't. If you read 1333 carefully, you [will] see that it is not intended to impede any humanitarian effort. It totally stays out of the humanitarian domain, and nor are they economic [sanctions]. They're not aimed at any economic or humanitarian transfers. They are political sanctions. They are sanctions on the Taliban leadership, on its travel, on its ability to move money, things like that. They are aimed at trying to influence that leadership to understand what the international community believes it should be doing to meet international norms of behaviour. They are absolutely not aimed at - and in fact were written precisely so that they wouldn't impact on the humanitarian aid or humanitarian or economic flows. Afghans can trade if they have money; Afghans can travel if they're not part of the Taliban superstructure. Do you know that 13,000 Afghans travelled to the Hajj this year? We have no problems [with that]. There's no way the sanctions would get at anything like that. These sanctions are aimed precisely at the top of the Taliban superstructure, and they are all political in nature.

Q: Do you think there has been a deliberate misrepresentation of the sanctions inside the country?

A: I do: by the Taliban for their own political purposes inside Afghanistan, and to some extent, here in Pakistan. Although I have not seen the government wilfully misrepresent the sanctions, there are some Pakistanis who do, both private and government operatives, but not at the policy level. And in some of the editorial pieces that you see in the [Pakistani] press. It's pure distortion to put people's minds against the sanctions. Unfair, but it's the way life is.

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