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Karzai fails first test as national unity leader
By Daud Aziz, M.D.
On Thursday, February 14, 2002, Dr. Abdur-Rahman, the Minister of Transportation and Tourism in Afghanistan's Interim Authority was killed at Kabul International Airport.
Both witnesses and officials, including an American diplomat and a British commander of the international peacekeeping force, initially said Muslim pilgrims stormed the plane Rahman had boarded. The pilgrims were furious when they found out that Rahman intended to use the sole Boeing 727 owned by Afghanistan's national carrier, Ariana Afghan Airlines, reportedly for an official trip to India. The pilgrims had waited for days for a flight to Saudi Arabia for the annual hajj pilgrimage to Mecca (-al Mokarama), and according to news reports, a couple had died in the winter cold.
Unfortunately, without waiting for even a preliminary investigation, Hamid Karzai, chairman of the Interim Authority, called Rahman's murder an assassination and pointed the finger directly to members of the United Front (or, as the Western press erroneously calls them, the Northern Alliance), Afghanistan's national resistance force during the Pakistani and Taliban occupation of the country and the terrorist activities of Al Qaida.
Anyone who follows the news knows that there remain ethnic and regional rivalries, stirred-up by Pakistan during its occupation of Afghanistan, between sympathizers of the Taliban against supporters and members of the United Front. An investigation of Rahman's murder may show that this was indeed a conspiracy stemming from some years-old factional feud. However, what Afghanistan needs the most right now is reconciliation and national unity. Nothing could be more unfortunate, divisive, and damaging than Mr. Karzai's irresponsible accusation and premature indictment of members of the United Front, who constitute the majority of the Interim Authority, and whose supporters make-up the majority of Afghans.
Certainly, this horrible act should be investigated and the perpetrators should be brought to justice. As a first step, however, Mr. Karzai should have urged calm and patience, rather than rabblerousing, jumping to conclusions, and pointing the finger at a particular group.
Mr. Karzai's initial appearance -- dressed in an overcoat (chapan) from northern Afghanistan, a lambskin (karakul) hat popular among the Tajiks, and his Pashtoon lineage -- boasted national unity for Afghanistan. However, his mishandling of Rahman's death is not going to go unnoticed by Afghans, especially those who most suffered under and resisted against Pakistan and its Taliban militia.
Some analysts have speculated that the proposed Loya Jirga [eds: Grand National Assembly] may be used as a mechanism for the return of rule by one ethnic group over all others, in a country in which there is not one ethnic majority. With this issue already unnerving many Afghans, some now question whether Mr. Karzai is using the murder of Rahman to defame the United Front and bolster some sort of ethno-centric power play.
The people of Afghanistan know, and its leaders must understand that as long as the ethnic card is used, a much-utilized Pakistani tool, and as long as the United Front, which prevented Pakistan from cementing its rule over Afghanistan, is defamed at every opportunity, nothing will be accomplished. Similarly, the United Front, or its supporters, must not continue to bring up their belief that the very same sympathizers of the Taliban have sold-out Afghanistan twice in the last twenty five years, first to the Soviet Union, and then again to Pakistan, the Taliban, and Al Qaida. Otherwise, the flames of both ancient and foreign-imposed feuds and rivalries will continue to consume all the efforts, capitol, and material intended for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. The result will be nothing but more destruction and further bloodshed.
As the leader of the Interim Authority, Mr. Karzai should take steps toward mending a tattered nation, healing old wounds, and large scale reconciliation in a meaningful, credible, and measurable way. ><
Afghan community impugns "elections" in DC
The following is the unedited text (except for grammatical corrections) of an open letter sent to various US officials, Afghan organizations, and Omaid Weekly by members of the Afghan community who participated in the so-called elections held in Washington, DC on 3 February 2002.
This document highlights some of the issues surrounding the Loya Jirga elections of February 3, 2002, dubbed the "Electoral College Election." The issues compiled herein denote the fact that the Afghan diaspora view the current evolvement of events as a significant and monumental period in Afghanistan's history. Hence, Afghans viewed the elections as an opportunity to engage in a process that would illustrate conformity and unity amongst our people.
Unfortunately, the Washington, DC elections lacked a number of the fundamental rules and regulations of a truly democratic process. For one, procedures designed to engage voters in an orderly and structured manner were often ignored, resulting in mass confusion and hardly an unremarkable precedent for future decision-making events.
To begin with, the objectives of the "Electoral College Election" were far from being defined to the general public. Hence, most voters did not know the basis or platform on which to choose their representatives. The questions often raised were:
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Would the elected representatives make up a lobbying body, or would they be taking part in the future Loya Jirga process? |
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What were the specific responsibilities of the elected officials? |
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What were the background requirements or the desired depth of the candidates with respect to lobbying and understanding Afghan issues? |
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Why did the election committee not make available information about the candidates prior to the elections? |
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Who were the official sponsors and designers of the election? |
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Did the election committee address the conflict of interest, or the probability of moral hazard, for candidates who also happen to run the election? |
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Why were the southeastern states with a significant Afghan population, such as Georgia, North Carolina, and Florida, excluded from the process? |
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Is it officially acceptable for candidates to be serving on the organizational committee, run as a candidate on the election day, and advertise for the event, as well as be present at end of the day to count the votes? Many of the elected candidates took part in all four events, ignoring the existence of a conflict of interest and elevating the possibility of manipulation. |
Additional questions remain, though we will press for answers to the questions surrounding the election platform.
We propose that there be a legitimate committee charged with overall responsibility for administering the newly elected candidates. The selected committee should strive to ensure fair and equal application of election laws for all participants in the electoral process. The committee's mission should be to promote consistent administration of all elections and campaign rules and regulations, to provide clear and concise information to the public regarding policies that concern the future of Afghanistan. Public opinion polls for the Afghan participation are necessary and vital to making decisions with regards to our sustainable future. The organizers must understand that there ought to be rules and regulations when it comes to election, rules that all participants must abide by.
Elections are fundamental to Democracy. They are the crucial steps by which citizens come together for a common goal: to select representatives or leaders who will address national and local concerns for the present and the future of a country. At stake are the political stabilization and the reconstruction of Afghanistan.
In our view, the organizers of the event failed to follow the simple rules of a basic election. Therefore, we ask that the results of the election held on February 3, 2002 at the World Bank be negated. Furthermore, we propose the creation of an oversight committee for decisions involving the Afghan population. One of the responsibilities of the oversight committee will be ensuring that personal or "political" agendas play no part in decisions meant to serve all Afghans.
If the responsibility of this elected group is to serve as a lobbying body for the reconstruction of Afghanistan, then Afghan communities ought to be made aware of all relevant activities. Afghan non-governmental agencies (NGOs) must be given their due part in the decision-making processes. As concerned citizens, Afghans expect periodic progress reports in respected media beyond Ariana TV, and longer notices.
Organizers are asked to operate a website for communicating to the public purposes related to this matter. As of this moment, most Afghans are in the dark with respect to the names of the members of the selected election committee and the qualifications of the running candidates.
We strongly emphasize that this group was not elected on the pretext of acting as decision makers and representatives in the Loya Jirga process. Perhaps the best venue for a new election is the Afghan Embassy, which recently opened its doors for servicing needs of the Afghan community.
The following lists a few of the discrepancies and ambiguities observed in the election process:
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Undefined objective |
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Certain candidates with insider information and longer lead times, often as long as two months, than others |
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Inadequate information about the candidates and their qualifications |
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Omission of four names from the list of candidates |
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Running candidates who were also tasked with overseeing the election process |
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Voters were required to contribute $1 towards the election; yet 1,500 votes netted only $1,100 |
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Individual candidates who also happened to be on the election committee |
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Candidates present during vote counts |
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Unusual and unnecessary pressure from Mr. Miskinyar inciting urgency in holding the elections |
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Incorrect and inconsistent statements by Mr. Miskinyar on sponsorship by the World Bank, it allegedly having provided the space, while the World Bank was neither aware nor provided permission for use of its facilities |
In conclusion, the questions raised above target neither the results nor the individual candidates who were ultimately elected. However, this document highlights issues that remain unanswered and those that require to be addressed by the organizers in fairness to other candidates and the community at large. ><
*From this week's English-language page
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