Published in issue #454 on 1 January 2001*
US distrust of Masood
rooted in Pak disinformation
The Taliban are doomed to unravel
Continued from issues #452
and #453, this is the
third part of Omaid Weekly's 15 December 2000 interview with Mr.
James A. Phillips, an esteemed international affairs analyst. Mr.
Phillips is currently a research fellow at The
Heritage Foundation, a prestigious think-tank in Washington.
Mr. Phillips' recent analytical writings -- both available
via www.omaid.com -- advocate an
immediate shift in US policy in Afghanistan. Much like the views
expressed in this newspaper by Afghans and Omaid Weekly's
editorial column, Mr. Phillips provides a solid and convincing
argument for Washington's support for the United Front to prevent
the annihilation of Afghanistan and circumvent the looming
terrorist outbreak against the US and the world at large. Dangers,
Mr. Phillips insists, that now incubate inside Taliban-occupied
areas of Afghanistan.
The Taliban militia, created and led by Pakistan's ISI
military intelligence agency, is also responsible for ethnic
cleansing and other untold atrocities in Afghanistan. Moreover,
the militia has entered into a mutually beneficial relationship
with international militant groups, such as Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaida
terrorist network. These extremists provide the Taliban with both
money and manpower in their war against Afghanistan's national
resistance force, the United Front. In return, the militia
provides terrorists with a safe haven in which they can recruit
and train hundreds of new followers from around the world.
These pressing issues were the focus of our interview with
Mr. Phillips:
Omaid Weekly: What changes in US policy do you foresee in a
G.W.
Bush administration? Will there be a continuation of Clinton's
"tough love" policy or will the new administration go
for the jugular to take down the Taliban?
JP: I don't think the Bush administration will be looking for a
fight. It won't say "that's enough, we're going in,"
because that would be crazy for any country. The way to deal with
the Taliban is not through American military means, because that
would polarize Afghans and Muslims, making it easier [for the
Taliban] to recruit terrorists, and it would strengthen radical
fundamentalists in many countries with which the US is friendly.
I haven't seen that much [from the Bush administration] on
Afghanistan per se. But we can look at what they are recommending
for Iraq, which is a much stronger support for the Iraqi
opposition, particularly by Paul Wolfowitz who was one of Bush's
primary Middle East and South Asia advisors. During the [2000 US
presidential] campaign, he was consulted a lot by [Bush's US
National Security Advisor-designate] Condoleeza Rice, and he's
believed to be going to a senior slot, probably in the Pentagon or
perhaps the State Department.
The model that [Wolfowitz] is recommending in Iraq would better
fit Afghanistan because the opposition [eds: United Front national
resistance force] there is much stronger. It's better organized,
it's experienced, and politically the Taliban have alienated
Afghans to an even greater extent than Saddam Hussein has
alienated Iraqis.
OW: What should we expect from a US State Department headed by
Gen. Collin Powell? How will a Powell State Department differ from
a Christopher or Albright State Department?
JP: I think Collin Powell and others in the Bush administration
are much more likely to put a premium on American national
interests and realpolitik rather than a focus on women's rights or
human rights, which got the Clinton administration in so much
trouble.
Bush is going to be much more reluctant to engage American
military power unless vital American interests are at stake. For
that reason, I don't think he's going to step-up [direct] military
pressures. It's more likely to be at least economic and possibly
military aid to the [United Front] opposition.
OW: What immediate steps should the new administration take?
JP: We should be working closely with not only the Afghan
[United Front] opposition but [also] with any of Afghanistan's
neighbors that resent the interference of the Taliban, and that
includes basically everyone except Pakistan.
The US should also be consulting with Saudi Arabia, which could
play a very important role. Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are very
close. The Saudis have considerable influence in Pakistan -- after
all, bin Laden is killing Americans now, but his ultimate goal is
the overthrow of the Saudi regime. Hopefully, US and Saudis
working together can convince Pakistan.
The US should be working with China on this issue, even Russia,
possibly even Iran. That is, if Iran would accept a stable,
democratic or a representative Afghan government -- it doesn't
have to be democracy in the Western sense; the shape of the
government is up to the Afghans.
All the outside powers just want to see a government that does
not export terrorism, revolution and drugs.
OW: Why do you believe Washington has had an acrimonious if not
hateful relationship with Ahmad Shah Masood? After all, by most
accounts, he was the most effective mujahideen leader in the war
against the Soviets. And furthermore, he is a devout Muslim but
not an extremist; a leader but not a dictator; he promotes
traditional Islamic law and also free elections and most
democratic values; he condemns terrorism but promotes trade and
commerce, such as the oil and gas pipeline.
JP: There are many people that follow Afghanistan in Washington
that are suspicious of Masood. I don't think they wish him harm
but they are suspicious of him, mostly because Pakistanis have
injected doubts about him. The State Department and CIA
bureaucracies were very dependent on Pakistan for information
about Afghanistan and that colored their analyses. I've met many
knowledgeable people that also are very supportive of Masood.
OW: Do you see a warming-up or improvement of relations between
Washington and Masood?
JP: I think it's already happening because there has been so
much frustration with the Taliban -- and even beyond that, I hope.
There is a sense in Washington that by turning its back on
Afghanistan the situation has festered and it's gotten much worse.
The way things are heading the US has to become more actively
involved in building a stable Afghanistan. As long as the Taliban
are in power there won't be a stable Afghanistan.
OW: What should Masood and the United Front do to improve
relations with the US and arrive at an understanding of their
common and mutual needs?
JP: [Masood and the UF] should highlight their differences with
the Taliban.
One of the biggest complaints I get when I call for US aid to
the Northern Alliance [eds: United Front] is that "those
groups are all the same," or "weren't we playing footsy
with bin Laden," which is a canard -- the US never supported
bin Laden [during the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union].
Bin Laden had not only his own money but the money of a lot of
his rich friends and probably Saudi intelligence money -- the
Saudis were matching the US dollar for dollar by the end of the
[Soviet-Afghan] war. The CIA station chief in Peshawar has
publicly denied ever cooperating with bin Laden. He said he knew
what [bin Laden] was doing, but it wasn't anything that was
coordinated. Bin Laden didn't need US cooperation.
There are certain people that have an interest in [the US] in
delegitimizing the Reagan doctrine of aid to those opposing the
Soviet Union by saying we created this "blowback" or
these Frankenstein monsters -- that we created bin Laden. We
didn't create bin Laden, the Soviets created bin Laden -- the
Soviet invasion did.
But these same people, after they make this argument they say
"if you support Masood he will turn into the same
thing." So one way Masood and the Northern Alliance could
help those of us pushing for this kind of aid is to clarify the
differences. How do [Masood and the UF] see the long-term future
of Afghanistan? Will it be interfering in its neighbor's affairs?
Most Afghans are tired and they realize they have so much they
need to do at home, why pick fights with your neighbors? But there
are ideologues -- the Taliban see themselves as the vanguard of
Islamic revolution; and bin Laden has fanned these flames. As long
as that kind of thing is going on, then tragically the Afghans
will continue to suffer.
Concluded in our next
issue.
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